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Abstract:  
For many political economists, the loss of monetary sovereignty is the major reason for why 
the Southern periphery fared so badly in the Euro area crisis. Monetary sovereignty here 
means the ability of the central bank to devalue the exchange rate or to buy government 
debt by printing the domestic currency. We explore this diagnosis by comparing three 
countries - Hungary, Latvia and Greece – that received considerable amounts of external 
assistance under different monetary regimes. The evidence does not suggest that monetary 
sovereignty helped Hungary and Latvia to stabilize their economies. Rather, cooperation and 
external assistance made foreign banks share in the costs of stabilization. By contrast, the 
provision of liquidity by the ECB inadvertently facilitated the reduction of foreign banks’ 
exposure to Greece which left the Greek sovereign even more exposed. By viewing the Euro 
area as a monetary system rather than an incomplete state, we see that what is needed for 
Euro area stabilization is cooperation over banking union, rather than a fully-fledged federal 
budget. 
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Introduction 
For many political economists, the loss of monetary sovereignty is the major reason  why 
the Southern periphery fared so badly in the Euro area crisis. In this context, monetary 
sovereignty means the ability of the central bank to devalue the exchange rate or to buy 
government debt by printing the domestic currency. Exchange rate devaluation is 
emphasized by comparative political economists like Hall (2012) and Scharpf (2013) who 
focus on national political economies that make up the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU)1. They argue that Southern European economies lack the institutions to restrain 
wage increases in line with productivity growth, and therefore need exchange rate 
adjustments vis-à-vis the Northern economies to compensate for the inflation differential if 
they are not to  experience stagnation and mass unemployment. In a widely cited paper, De 
Grauwe (2011) stresses another aspect of monetary sovereignty, namely that the central 
bank of a sovereign state can issue the money with which to buy its own government’s 
bonds, while sovereigns within the Euro area cannot create money to buy their own debt. 
Sovereignty in this sense is valuable because the monetary authority can act as lender of last 
resort to the government in a crisis.    
These scholars find benefits in floating exchange rates and money creation capacity that 
were not evident to the countries that initiated the process of monetary union in the late 
1980s. Their experience had been that  floating exchange rates were accompanied by 
excessive volatility, due to exchange rate overshooting and ‘sudden stops’ of capital 
movements. Banking crises occurred much more frequently in the wake of financial 
                                                           
 
1 We use ‘EMU’ here in its popular sense, referring to the union of countries that have adopted the 
single currency. 
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liberalisation than during the Bretton Woods era (Babecký et al, 2012: fig.1).2  Far from 
finding a floating exchange rate a useful instrument of adjustment, countries  found that it 
was difficult to manage the rate through monetary policy. Rey (2013) presents evidence that 
floating exchange rates do not give national authorities control over domestic credit: 
monetary conditions are subject to a common global cycle, even in developed countries. To 
receive some stability in the face of such external pressures was and is one of the prime 
motivations for entering EMU. In this light it is ironic that critics of EMU have responded to 
the financial crisis by reasserting the benefits of monetary sovereignty.  
Rather than mourning a bygone era, it seems more pertinent to ask why EMU has not been 
able to provide sufficient resources for stabilization to its members, by contrast with 
European Union (EU) countries outside the Euro area. We focus on stabilization rather than 
growth, because the latter depends on many factors that cannot be directly attributed to a 
monetary union. Our account follows the classic analysis of Kindleberger (1973), who traced 
how regional or global depressions result from the failure of the international monetary 
system. In the 1930s Depression, banks failed for want of liquidity in a reserve currency, 
governments were forced into pro-cyclical contraction by a sudden stop of capital flows, and 
mercantilistic protectionism compounded the effects on world trade (Kindleberger 1973: 
292). Successful stabilization in the face of contagious financial panics requires that liquidity 
is provided to banks and governments, spiraling economic contraction is not precipitated for 
want of credit, and gains from trade continue to be realized.   
                                                           
2 Blanchard (2013) summarizes recent economic research finding that stability is promoted with 
managed rather than free floating, given that large exchange rate fluctuations are disruptive for the 
real economy and financial markets. 
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Applying this analysis to the debate about the Euro, we notice two things. First, exchange 
rate adjustment could be an element of stabilization if, for example, capital flight is induced 
by an overvalued currency. But the global financial crisis of 2008 was not caused by currency 
misalignment, but by a breakdown of lending between financial institutions uncertain about 
each others’ solvency. Stabilization called for massive injections of liquidity into the banking 
system, and for support for governments hit by the travails of their banks. 
Second, small open economies with their own currencies cannot provide these financial 
resources themselves. They need access to reserve currencies. They might get support from 
other central banks, and they also can have recourse to official lending. Euro area countries, 
by contrast, have access to a reserve currency through their banking systems. In the early 
stages of the financial crisis, this was seen as a tremendous asset. One aim of our discussion 
is to explain how it subsequently became a liability. 
We begin our analysis with a review of the exchange rate regimes in place among the 
countries of the EU, which forms the basis for our subsequent case selection. This review 
leaves us with a puzzle. It seems, in 2013, that Euro membership does make a difference to 
a country’s recovery prospects. Yet it makes a difference even compared with countries that 
did not adjust their exchange rates vis-à-vis the Euro. Several of those countries did not start 
from a better position: they also had long-standing external imbalances.  To unravel these 
anomalies, we have to trace what happened to monetary and fiscal conditions. This means 
looking at the Euro area in a different way: not as a fixed exchange rate system but as a 
supranational monetary system with specific capacities and limitations arising from the 
provision of liquidity through a single central bank. as well as specific ways of allocating the 
losses arising from insolvency. Our argument is that the difficulties faced by the weaker Euro 
5 
 
member states do not arise from closing off the possibility of exchange rate adjustment, but 
from how the burden of reducing indebtedness is distributed between sovereigns, domestic 
and international banks, households and firms. 
To examine in detail how stabilization occurs under different exchange rate regimes, we 
compare three country cases: Hungary, Latvia and Greece. These comparisons allow us to 
see how how important devaluation was for Hungary’s resumption of growth, compared 
with Latvia, which went through a brutal internal devaluation while maintaining its peg to 
the Euro. We also explore how relevant the ability to print the domestic currency was for 
financing the government in Hungary and Latvia, and compare  the devastating debt 
dynamic of Greece.   
Turning finally to identifying the missing elements in the provision of stabilization in the 
Euro area, we draw on the updating of Kindleberger’s hegemonic stability theory provided 
by Eichengreen (1987) and De Long and Eichengreen (2013), and argue against the latter’s 
criticism of Germany’s unwillingness to act as hegemon.   While the ECB lacks a sovereign, 
Germany lacks a central bank, and this limits the capacity of either to provide stability. The 
collective resources of the IMF and the EU, augmented by some bilateral assistance, were 
adequate for stabilizing EU countries outside the Euro area. The explanation is not that 
these countries benefited from exchange rate adjustment or were able to create money to 
buy their own debt. Rather, beggar-thy-neighbor behavior by banks was avoided by 
obtaining cooperation from the home states of foreign banks. We conclude that a banking 
union with a collective resolution fund would do much to close the gap in capacity for 
stabilization that we observe between the Euro and non-Euro EU members.  
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How have countries with different exchange rate regimes fared in the crisis? 
At the time the financial crisis broke, in October 2008, there were 27 states in the EU, of 
which 16 used the Euro (Estonia joined in January 2011). The remaining states were free to 
allow their currencies to depreciate against the Euro. However, several did not. Bulgaria, 
Latvia and Lithuania joined Estonia in seeking to maintain a fixed parity with a view to 
eventual Euro entry (Latvia joined the Euro in 2014). The Danish Krone also hardly moved 
against the Euro, appreciating very slightly. Sweden and the Czech Republic allowed their 
currencies to depreciate against the Euro in 2008-09, but subsequently their currencies 
floated up again (overall, between 2008 and 2012, the Swedish Krona appreciated by 10%, 
while the Koruna fell by less than 2%). The UK Pound fell sharply 2007-2009, but by 2012 
had almost returned to its 2008 value. This left just three EU countries where there has 
been a sustained exchange rate depreciation: Hungary (-13% between 2008 and 2012), 
Poland (-16%) and Romania (-17%).3 
Table 1 shows GDP growth over the period 2008-2012 for countries in each of the three 
groups: those that held their currencies fixed, those where a depreciation at the onset of 
the crisis was reversed, and those that have had a sustained depreciation. Growth figures 
for the worst-performing Euro members are also shown for comparison. The modal country 
experience is a fall in GDP of around 5%, and it is found in three of the four regime types. 
The worst economic performances are found in the Euro and fixed-rate countries, an 
observation that seems to lend support to the argument that exchange rate adjustment is 
an important policy tool.  
                                                           
3 AMECO data: annual average national currency exchange rates against the Euro. 
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Table 1: Real GDP growth 2008-2012 
Euro members Non-Euro fixed rate Temporary deval’n Sustained deval’n 
Greece -19.9 Bulgaria -2.6 Czech Rep -1.6 Hungary -5.6 
Ireland -3.9 Denmark -3.6 Sweden 5.8 Poland 12.4 
Italy -5.8 Latvia -9.2 UK -1.0 Romania -5.0 
Portugal -5.7 Lithuania -5.2     
Slovenia -8.3       
Spain -5.0       
Source: AMECO; own calculations  
 
However, as of June 2013, one gets another picture from looking at recent and forecast GDP 
growth (table 2). Here it is clearer why commentators see the Euro as a problem. All the 
non-Euro members are expected to show positive growth over the period 2012-14. More 
generally, many of the non-Euro countries experienced a sharp decline in GDP in 2008-2010 
but then got onto a trajectory of recovery, while the weaker members of the Euro area still 
show no signs of recovery, except Ireland. In other words, being out of the Euro did not 
prevent economic decline, but it did allow countries to recover. Again, however, we notice a 
difficulty: there is no general difference between the countries that held their parity with 
the Euro and those that had either temporary or sustained exchange rate adjustments. 
Looking at Latvia, for example, the fixed exchange rate strategy might be said to have 
imposed high costs 2008-12, but there is clearly a strong bounce-back in progress.  
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Table 2: Projected real GDP growth 2012-2014 
Euro members Non-Euro fixed rate Temporary deval’n Sustained deval’n 
Greece -3.6 Bulgaria 2.6 Czech Rep 1.2 Hungary 1.6 
Ireland 3.3 Denmark 2.4 Sweden 4.0 Poland 3.3 
Italy -0.6 Latvia 8.1 UK 2.3 Romania 3.9 
Portugal -1.8 Lithuania 6.8     
Slovenia -2.0       
Spain -0.6       
Source: European Commission, DG EcFin, Estimates and projections as of May 2013 
 
For political economists who adhere to the discourse of maintaining institutional 
comparative advantage, the missing variable which explains this pattern of results is the 
capacity for domestic adjustment. Ireland managed a substantial ‘internal devaluation’, as 
did Latvia and Lithuania among the fixed-rate outsiders. But table 3 shows that this 
‘competitiveness story’ does not help us to understand the different fates of the countries 
in the crisis. The real exchange rates of most of the Southern Euro members have 
depreciated significantly, if not quite as much as Ireland. Furthermore, their primary current 
account positions have moved near to balance (IMF 2013e Box 1.3). 
Table 3 highlights two relevant observations. First of all, some Euro area and fixed rate 
countries have substantially improved their real exchange rates in the last few years, despite 
their nominally fixed rates. Second, nominal exchange rate adjustment is of limited utility in 
promoting competitiveness: Latvia and Lithuania have seen larger real adjustments than 
two of the countries that devalued, Hungary and Romania. 
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Table 3: Real exchange rate change, 2008-2012 
Euro members Non-Euro fixed rate Temporary deval’n Sustained deval’n 
Greece -10.5 Bulgaria 17.5 Czech Rep -0.2 Hungary -9.0 
Ireland -19.4 Denmark -0.8 Sweden 7.9 Poland -16.9 
Italy 1.2 Latvia -15.4 UK 4.6 Romania -8.1 
Portugal -6.5 Lithuania -10.3     
Slovenia 2.8       
Spain -10.7       
Source: DG Ecfin quarterly competitiveness report, REER based on unit labor costs (total economy) 
 
Critics who hold that Euro membership produces fundamental competitive misalignments 
have another argument up their sleeves, however. It is that the weaker Euro member states 
accumulated imbalances in the 2000s which heightened their vulnerability to the financial 
crisis and left them having to undergo a long painful structural adjustment to return to 
growth. This argument proposes that non-Euro states have been able to return to growth 
faster because they did not start from a position of long-standing external imbalance (and 
thus accumulation of external indebtedness), which Euro membership facilitated. 
Again, the data do not support the argument. Financial markets were very liquid before the 
crisis, and they financed external imbalances even when there was some exchange rate risk 
(table 4). In other words, non-Euro countries also increased their indebtedness, and some 
had housing bubbles. Table 4 identifies the countries which had accumulated the greatest 
external debt between 2000 and 2008 (measured as the cumulated current account deficit 
as a share of GDP). We do indeed find that some Euro members accumulated large 
imbalances, but not all. Greece takes the prize for the largest accumulated deficit, but only 
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just, from Latvia and Bulgaria. It is clear that the financial markets were ready to lend 
regardless of Euro membership or currency regime. 
Table 4: Cumulative current account imbalances, 2000-2008 (in % of GDP) 
Euro members Non-Euro fixed rate Temporary deval’n Sustained deval’n 
Greece -119 Bulgaria -103 Czech Rep -35 Hungary -68 
Ireland -19 Denmark 25 Sweden 61 Poland -32 
Italy -8 Latvia -111 UK -19 Romania -66 
Portugal -89 Lithuania -75     
Slovenia -21       
Spain -58       
Source: AMECO 
 
We have shown that GDP contracted sharply in most EU countries after the financial crisis, 
particularly those which had accumulated large external imbalances. Falling GDP has the 
potential to induce a downward spiral in a heavily indebted country: the debt/GDP ratio 
increases (an increase in leverage), but deleveraging is required in response to the change in 
financial conditions.  An imperative of stabilization is to reverse the decline in GDP so that 
deleveraging can occur through income growth. The alternative is to write off and 
restructure debt, but this amplifies the liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis. In particular, it 
can induce a further contraction in GDP by undermining the solvency of the banking system.    
In the following discussion, we look at the process of stabilization as it unfolded inside and 
outside the Euro area. Our aim is to establish how the international monetary system 
worked: in particular, why official external lending supported successful stabilization 
programs outside the Euro area but not inside it. Stabilization in the context of official 
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lending has a specific meaning: it refers to the restoration of financial market access for 
solvent borrowers, particularly the sovereign. Stabilization does not mean that a country’s 
economic problems are over: sectoral imbalances may persist and growth may be sluggish, 
but it does mean that these problems are not being exacerbated by the monetary regime.  
What do country experiences tell us about stabilization inside and outside the Euro area? 
In the previous section, we showed that exchange rate regimes seem to make a difference 
to EU countries’ GDP trajectories, although this difference cannot readily be mapped on to 
changes in real exchange rates or ‘competitiveness’. We take a closer look in this section 
that is, of necessity, selective. Leaving aside the countries which undertook temporary 
depreciations, we take one country case from each of the regimes we identified. For the 
Euro area, we take Greece: if we can show here that the country’s crisis has been made 
worse by the limitations of Euro area stabilization, it applies a forteriori to others. For the 
fixed-rate countries, we take Latvia, and from those that undertook depreciation we choose 
Hungary. All three are exemplary cases for our focus on how resources for stabilization were 
provided under different exchange rate regimes, as all three required very high levels of 
external assistance. 
Hungary 
Hungary was the first of our three countries to to call for international financial assistance, 
in October 2008. Hungarian government bonds suffered a sharp sell-off by non-residents, 
leaving the government facing failed auctions and a financing gap. The country had a high 
level of external debt, private as well as public, and was therefore vulnerable to the freeze 
on lending emanating from abroad. The Forint was allowed to depreciate, so the central 
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bank did not suffer a loss of reserves from defending the currency, but this did not resolve 
the liquidity problem. Furthermore, currency depreciation threatened the solvency of the 
domestic non-bank sector, which was exposed in foreign currency-denominated debt. Its 
income flows, in Forints, were mismatched with its liabilities, in Swiss Francs and other 
currencies. Insolvency of households and firms would impose losses on the banks (IMF 
2008: 4). 
The sharp fall in GDP in 2009 led to a worsening of the government’s financial position. 
Economic contraction may be good for rebalancing the current account, but it is bad for 
government finances, both in flows (tax receipts decline) and stocks (the ratio of debt to 
GDP rises even with stable debt). Hungary’s government deficits in 2009-10 were substantial 
(over 4% of GDP) and debt ratios rose somewhat, but not explosively. So long as the 
external market was closed to Hungarian government debt, the government faced a 
financing gap, as there was limited domestic capacity to take up government debt. The 
government bond market was illiquid, but the government was not insolvent. The central 
bank could buy (more) debt, but if it created money to do so, it risked triggering a further 
slide in the Forint, which threatened corporate and household solvency.  
The international lending program addressed these problems with a loan of €20 billion 
(including €12.5 billion from the IMF and €6.5 billion from the EU) to the Hungarian central 
bank (MNB4). This enabled the MNB to meet private sector liquidity needs as well as 
financing the government deficit and refinancing public debt falling due (IMF 2011: 19, Box 
1).  The provision of budgetary support by external agencies was necessary because the 
supposed benefits of monetary sovereignty - unlimited money creation by the central bank 
                                                           
4 MNB: Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
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and currency depreciation – brought with them significant risks to the stability of the 
financial system. .  
It remained that private external flows could undermine the program. In the worst-case 
scenario, official lending could be consumed by a sustained withdrawal of creditors from 
Hungary. As the head of the IMF mission, Anne-Marie Gulde, put it in an interview: ‘If the 
banks weren’t willing to roll over their loans, recapitalize their subsidiaries and more 
generally maintain their exposure to the region, it would have been difficult to avert a 
systemic crisis, even with the loans provided by the IMF, the European Union, [..etc]. In fact, 
those funds would have served only to bail out the private sector, replacing private debt by 
public sector debt, and done little to help the countries back on their feet, if we hadn’t 
acted.’ (IMF 2009a)  The action in question was the Vienna Initiative, or more formally the 
European Bank Coordination Initiative (EBCI), which aimed to ensure that the large foreign 
banks operating in Central and Eastern Europe maintained their presence in the region. 
On the IMF’s account, the EBCI addressed a ‘collective action problem’ for banks: if some 
banks withdrew, they would trigger an economic decline which would increase the credit 
risk faced by those banks remaining (Berglöf, in IMF 2009a). Other commentators have 
amplified this account, showing that there was also a collective action problem for national 
regulators, both home and host. Home governments had injected funds to recapitalize their 
banks and this was accompanied by pressure to sustain their home lending. There was a risk 
that beggar thy neighbor policies would be pursued by home states, through regulatory 
requirements that the banks they were supporting should reduce the exposures of their CEE 
subsidiaries (Kudrna and Gabor 2013: 560). Banks also sought protection from host state 
regulators and governments, for example against restrictions on the repatriation of profits 
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and possible discriminatory actions by host states concerned to protect their own banks, 
which governments were having to support (Epstein 2013: 5-9).  Epstein argues that 
subsidiaries of foreign banks had an interest in signaling that they would not ‘cut and run’ 
and thus jeopardize their long-term investment in a profitable economic region. They made 
much of their wish to maintain their presence, to avoid ‘fire sale’ losses and to position 
themselves for a future recovery.    
The IMF took a leading role in the EBCI, as it wished to avoid substituting decreasing 
commercial funding with official assistance. It had a track record of seeking rollover 
commitments from international banks, for example in Turkey and Brazil (Barkbu et al 2012: 
Table 3). The quid pro quo was that IMF/EU program conditions protected the interests of 
foreign banks (Nitsche 2010: 11). In some countries, official lending and commercial bank 
commitments were closely coupled. In Hungary, the link was loose: the IMF/EU program 
agreed in November 2008 preceded the formal agreement by banks in May 2009. The 
banks’ commitments were rather general: to maintain their overall exposure to Hungary 
and to meet requirements for additional capital as necessary. Six major banks signed the 
communique, from Germany, Belgium and Italy as well as three from Austria, which were in 
terms of nationality the largest creditors. As Table 5 shows, they did maintain their presence 
in 2009: foreign claims fell only slightly. Foreign parent banks stepped up funding of their 
Hungarian subsidiaries during the crisis (IMF 2011: Box 1). Subsequently, however, foreign 
banks have exited Hungary, gradually but distinctly. Table 5 also shows that banks from the 
most exposed country (Austria) increased their relative presence (until recently). This 
pattern - that the banking system of the most exposed state becomes more exposed -  is 
also evident in our other case studies (see Tables 6 and 7 below). It suggests that there is 
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indeed a collective action problem for banks, and that those that are most exposed 
internalize the externalities of withdrawing, while the least exposed free-ride by exiting. 
Table 5: Bank exposures to Hungary 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total foreign claims 
..in % GDP 111.6 96.5 99.2 83.0 82.4 
..% change Dec-Dec 12.2 -2.5 -14.8 -15.3 -5.1 
Share of Austrian  
banks 24.0 24.8 26.7 28.1 25.5* 
*Figure for March 2013, due to missing data for Sept-Dec 2012. 
Sources: own calculations based on BIS Quarterly Reviews Statistical Annex, Table 9B: Consolidated 
foreign claims of reporting banks - immediate borrower basis; GDP in $US: World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD) 
 
How was a downward spiral of indebtedness and contraction avoided, and stabilization 
achieved? Three elements were important. First, the banking system imposed limited costs 
on the Hungarian sovereign. While bank recapitalization was envisaged, the eventual costs 
do not even appear as a separate item in the IMF’s analyses. Emergency lending from the 
government to the banks in 2008 was repaid. It was Hungary’s good fortune that other 
sovereigns bailed out the foreign-owned banks.  
The second element was that government expenditure growth had to be reined in, but 
expenditure was not cut in nominal terms. There was no collapse in domestic demand 
arising from fiscal retrenchment. Here we do see a benefit of devaluation: not only was no 
‘internal devaluation’ through public sector wage-cutting needed, but also devaluation had 
the effect of writing down Forint-denominated government debt. Devaluation was good for 
government finances.  
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However, it was bad for households. Households had taken out loans in foreign exchange to 
evade high domestic interest rates, and devaluation increased the burden of this debt, from 
42% of GDP in 2008 to 55% of GDP in early 2009 (IMF 2013a: 20, Box 2). The forex debt 
problem was not universal but nonetheless significant: it affected roughly 800,000 
households, or 20 percent of the total (IMF 2012: 110).  
This brings us to the third element in Hungary’s stabilization: the imposition of some 
adjustment costs on foreign banks. Despite sharp criticism from the official lenders, Hungary 
introduced a special levy on banks in June 2010. The IMF responded by suspending its 
program (Kudrna and Gabor 2013: 557). The government followed this up with a program in 
late 2011 under which, during a 5 month window, customers could repay their mortgages at 
a preferential exchange rate, roughly 30 percent below market rates. This time it was the 
turn of the European Commission to protest, abetted by an unfavorable assessment by 
Austria of the effect on banking sector stability. At first the government’s response was 
intransigent, but it eventually settled for a compromise that enabled banks to set off some 
of the costs of mortgage redemption against the bank levy. Nonetheless, the tax burden on 
the financial sector in Hungary remains exceptionally high, the treatment of foreign 
exchange loans to households and small businesses is still not fully resolved, and the banks 
are holding high levels of non-performing household debt (European Commission 2014: 32-
33).  
In summary, the financial crisis did not destabilize Hungarian sovereign finances to a high 
degree because costs were borne by other governments and by banks themselves, as well 
as falling on households. It would be wrong to portray the policy mix as progressive: 
mortgage relief has been criticized as poorly targeted, as only wealthier households could 
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repay with a one-off payment. Households have also suffered the expropriation of their 
pension assets, raided by the government to prop up its finances (IMF 2013a: Box 1). It also 
remains that Hungary’s sovereign access to financial markets is by no means secure. 
Nonetheless, as of 2014 the IMF’s job was done: it has bridged the crisis and seen market 
access restored.  
 Latvia 
Latvia sought financial assistance shortly after Hungary. Its problems took a different form. 
The country’s vulnerabilities were in the private financial sector, not the public sector, which 
had exceptionally low debt. In November 2008, the government was forced to take over the 
country’s largest deposit bank, Parex Banka, after a run on deposits. This came at a time 
when governments throughout the EU were guaranteeing their banks, and Parex was 
vulnerable because it lacked a foreign parent (Anderson 2008). Levels of non-resident 
deposits were relatively high, and these deposits proved the most footloose, falling by 30% 
in the 12 months from August 2008 (IMF 2013b: 12). Furthermore, there were risks of a 
sharp credit contraction elsewhere in the banking system, as banks operating in Latvia were 
affected by the freezing of wholesale funds markets. 
A central issue in the design of Latvia’s stabilization program was its membership of a fixed 
exchange rate regime, ERM II (Lütz and Kranke 2013).  The rules for Euro accession require 
countries to maintain membership of ERM II for two years (along with other conditions) 
although this would have allowed the exchange rate to move by plus or minus 15% around 
the central parity. The approach taken by the Latvian authorities since 2005 was to fix the 
Lats to the Euro with only a narrow (1%) fluctuation band. Some IMF officials took the view 
that Latvia should leave ERM II when the crisis broke (Lütz and Kranke 2013: table 3). 
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Officials had pointed out in an Article IV consultation in 2007 that Latvia’s persistent current 
account deficit suggested that the Lats was overvalued. Yet restoration of competitiveness 
does not seem to have been their most pressing concern in advocating depreciation; rather, 
as in Hungary, the IMF was concerned that official financing would be consumed as private 
investors fled the country. Maintaining a fixed exchange rate meant offering favorable 
terms to retreating investors. By contrast, a lower value for the currency would make them 
think again and indeed help to lure them back as liquidity was restored in the world financial 
system.  
The European Commission disagreed, and they were backed by Sweden and the Latvian 
government itself. Some IMF officials apparently concurred (Åsland and Dombrovskis 2011: 
43), probably because they appreciated how comprehensively the economy was already 
‘Euro-ized’, with a startling 70% of deposits and 90% of loans denominated in foreign 
currency (IMF 2009b: 10).  Devaluation would present the same problems of ‘balance sheet 
mismatch’ (income in domestic currency, debt servicing expenditure in foreign currency) 
that had faced Hungarian borrowers, but in a more extreme form. Furthermore, by contrast 
with Hungary, more than half of Latvian government debt was denominated in foreign 
currency (IMF 2013b Table 4). There were no quick wins to be had from devaluation and 
issuing domestic currency.5 
A major problem was how the fixed exchange rate could be defended without inducing a 
sharp domestic monetary contraction. The central bank can restrain demand for foreign 
exchange by restricting the supply of liquidity to the banking system (for example, by raising 
                                                           
5 Indeed, public debt dynamics were worsened by the depreciation of the Euro against other 
currencies, particularly in 2010, as some debt was denominated in dollars and Swiss francs (IMF 
2013b Table 6). 
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the collateral requirements for banks borrowing from the central bank). If depositors sought 
to take funds out of the country and the central bank could not supply forex, banks would 
need cross-border interbank credit. If interbank credit was not available, banks would have 
to sell assets, presumably at ‘fire sale’ prices (Bindseil and Winkler 2012: 32). Latvian banks 
had substantial foreign assets, amounting to some 45% of GDP. However, the IMF noted 
that ‘the market value of these assets and the ability to realize these quickly in the current 
international financial environment has come into question.’ (IMF 2009b: 6) In short, to 
prevent fire sales, the central bank should provide forex, obtained by international 
borrowing. 
To this effect, the European Commission, the IMF and the Nordic countries made a very 
large commitment of funds. Moreover, the Danish and Swedish central banks extended 
swap lines to Riga, based on their own access to ECB and Federal Reserve funds.6 As with 
Hungary, it was important to Latvian stabilization that foreign banks did not sharply reduce 
their exposure, but there were substantial falls in 2009-10 and thereafter (Table 6). There 
was an attempt to bring the four largest foreign-owned banks operating in Latvia (one 
Danish, one Finnish and two Swedish banks) into the framework of the EBCI. They signed a 
commitment in September 2009, but the EU-IMF loan had been agreed in December 2008.  
Nitsche (2011) suggests that bilateral commitments were more important in the Latvian 
case than the multilateral EBCI framework, with the Swedish government playing a major 
role. 
                                                           
6 See Allen and Moessner (2010 Graph 7.1) for the array of swaps in place in 2008-09. 
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Table 6: Bank exposures to Latvia 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total foreign claims 
..in % GDP 140.7 92.1 96.8 87.7 72.4 
..% change Dec-Dec 6.8 -23.5 -19.2 -16.0 -2.5 
Share of Swedish  
banks 57.3 64.3 66.6 69.5 71.9 
Sources: see table 5 
 
By the beginning of 2009, the Bank of Latvia was no longer having to make net sales of 
foreign exchange (IMF 2009b: Fig 3), but a severe contraction of credit occurred anyway, as 
table 6 shows. The fiscal side of the story was also highly contractionary. Primary 
expenditure was cut in nominal terms in successive years from 2008 to 2011, falling by 13% 
over the three years. Particularly striking was the cumulative reduction of one-third in public 
sector remuneration (IMF 2013b, Table 3). The shrinkage of the economy produced high 
primary fiscal deficits (5.9% of GDP in 2009 and 5% in 2010). The government debt-GDP 
ratio soared from 7.8% of GDP in 2007 to 39.7% by 2010, largely because of economic 
contraction but also due to bank recapitalization costs amounting to some 4.5% of GDP (IMF 
2013b, Table 4).  Many Latvian households saw a substantial fall in their real incomes, 
including those directly affected by fiscal cuts affecting public sector employment and social 
security payments.  
Why did this curtailment of demand not produce the downward spiral of a depressed 
domestic economy under sovereign financial constraints, whereby shrinking GDP produces 
deteriorating public finances, more fiscal contraction and deeper depression? Part of the 
answer is that Latvia is very small and very open compared with the Southern Euro 
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countries.  It was possible for Latvia to have an export-led recovery.  Furthermore, while the 
fall in GDP inevitably produced an adverse change in public debt, the low initial level of debt 
combined with the availability of full finance from official sources meant that interest 
payments remained modest. Only a small primary surplus was needed for sustainability. 
Latvia stayed out of the financial markets for an extended period, returning in December 
2012 with a bond issue, for which it incurred only a small spread. The very high level of 
program finance available to Latvia meant that questions about market confidence never 
unsettled the recovery. In the end, €3bn of the program funds were not required (IMF 
2013b: Box 1). 
Finally, as in Hungary, foreign banks shared some of the losses arising from their inflated 
property-related lending in Latvia. In 2009, Prime Minister Dombrovskis proposed that the 
liabilities of mortgage holders to lenders should be limited to the current value of the 
property, which would have had the effect of writing down banks’ mortgage loan portfolios. 
The response from Sweden was quick and unforgiving: the government threatened to 
withhold a €1bn credit tranche in 2010 (Lütz and Kranke 2010: 25).  Negotiations ensued 
and a compromise was reached which limited the recourse of banks where borrowers were 
declared bankrupt.7 It is estimated that the four major Nordic parent banks wrote off €900m 
in bad loans to Latvian households (Kudrna and Gabor 2013: 559). While this is a non-trivial 
amount (4.5% of 2012 Latvian GDP), governments in the parent states protected their banks 
from greater losses by coordinating a policy to maintain exposure, backed up with 
cooperation between central banks. This ad hoc cooperation arguably saved Latvia’s small, 
open economy from entering a downward spiral. 
                                                           
7 Limited recourse restricts the ability of banks to claim from the borrower the difference between 
the value of the loan and the value of the collateral. 
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Greece 
Greece comes last in our chronological narrative, and indeed the delayed onset of crisis is 
important in understanding how Euro membership made a difference to stabilization after 
the financial crisis. ECB policies initially protected Greece, along with other highly-indebted 
Euro economies, from the impact of the financial crisis. The dire state of Greek public 
finances was well-known, but only when the ECB signaled that exceptional liquidity support 
would come to an end did  the crisis erupt. In the discussion below, we explain why it is to 
be expected in a currency union that stresses appear in the form of a sovereign debt crisis, 
rather than a banking crisis.  
It is important to acknowledge the success of the ECB, in the immediate aftermath of the 
failure of Lehman Bros, in maintaining liquidity in the Euro area banking system (Schelkle 
2012: 46-49). The key policy was to allow banks to obtain finance from the central bank at a 
low borrowing rate, limited only by their ability to post eligible collateral. The ECB also 
broadened the range of eligible collateral (‘qualitative easing’ as Buiter (2008) termed it). 
The effect was that, as transactions between banks declined, transactions between banks 
and the ECB increased. This in turn supported bank lending to the non-financial private 
sector (households and corporations). Giannone et al (2012: 3) estimate that the effect by 
2011 was that industrial production in the Euro area was 2% higher, and the unemployment 
rate 0.6% lower, than it would have been in the absence of the ECB’s measures. 
Against this backdrop, an IMF team visited Greece for its regular Article IV consultation in 
May 2009. Their report completely fails to predict the storm to come, providing instead an 
amiable account of debates with the Greek authorities about the lack of space for a more 
expansionary fiscal policy and the desirability of postponing a planned tax cut. The report 
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notes that the Debt Office had been ‘agile’ in placing over €50bn of government debt – 21% 
of GDP – ‘with some shortening of terms to limit costs’ (IMF 2009c: 11). The only other 
source of concern was the exposure of Greek banks to Southeast Europe, where they had 
high loan-to-deposit ratios and relied heavily on parents’ funding. IMF staff argued that 
financial protectionism - curtailing operations in SEE to protect the banks’ domestic position 
- should be avoided and noted approvingly that Greek banks were participating in the 
Vienna Initiative. The report did not ignore Greece’s startling long-term fiscal problems. 
Echoing regular EU projections, the imminent decline in the working age population and the 
parameters of the pension system produced very adverse projections several decades 
forward (IMF 2009c: 27-28). Without policy changes, the government would be insolvent. 
However, it was not illiquid, and this meant that it would be able to ‘trade its way out of 
trouble’ with policy reforms. 
It may seem surprising that the liquidity of Greek sovereign debt was not in question in mid-
2009, given that there was no prospect of the ECB directly supporting the market for 
government bonds. The explanation is that the banking system was lending freely to the 
sovereign, and there was, at that time, no reason to expect this process to end. As Gabor 
(2012) has documented, the collateral policies of the ECB gave financial institutions no 
reason to be wary of Greek debt. European banks kept on expanding their exposure until 
the end of September 2009. In fact, the equal treatment of sovereign debt in the Euro area 
for the purpose of both central bank and private ‘repo’ transactions was promoted in 
pursuit of financial market integration. Banks were willing holders of Greek debt so long as 
they could pledge it to the ECB in return for valuable cash (Blundell-Wignall 2012: 217). To 
quote the IMF: ‘the liquidity assistance by the ECB (repos) had been, and will continue to be 
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for the near term, of major assistance to Greek banks and, indirectly, to funding the 
sovereign. Interlocutors agreed that without these monetary accommodations, Greek 
financing pressures would have been considerably higher.’ (IMF 2009c: 20) The ECB 
rendered government debt into cash even if it did not buy government debt. In this equal 
treatment of all participating sovereigns, the ECB is a cooperative institution. 
All this changed at the end of 2009. The ECB began to discuss its exit strategy, indicating 
that its discount window might close to lower grades of bonds (Trichet 2009). This would 
affect Greece, which had just a single ‘A’ rating at the start of 2009. Even though Greek 
bonds remained eligible at the ECB’s discount window, markets anticipated that they could 
become ineligible and took fright. Bondholders had not concerned themselves with Greece’s 
fiscal soundness when the window was open, but a change of monetary policy opened up 
the prospect of default.  Alarm bells were raised when the newly elected Greek government 
raised the planned deficit for 2009, from 3.7% in spring to 12.5% in autumn (Jones 2012: 
60). There had been plenty of notice of problems with Greek fiscal statistics, compiled in a 
Eurostat report in 2004 and reiterated publicly several times since then. Statistical problems 
were also clearly flagged in the IMF’s 2009 report. Financial markets – and the European 
Council - had ignored these concerns but, as ratings became critical, they suddenly paid 
attention.   
Table 7 shows how banks’ reductions in their exposure to Greece turned from a trickle into 
a flood in 2010. Compared with Hungary and Latvia, these exposures were heavily weighted 
towards the public sector, and this was where the sharpest falls occurred.8 We also see that 
                                                           
8 In December 2007, some 43% of banks’ exposure to Greece was to the public sector, compared 
with 27% in Hungary and 5% in Latvia. This had fallen to 24% by Dec 2011 and 7% by Dec 2012 (BIS 
Quarterly Reviews, Table 9C). 
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French banks (which had the largest exposure) and German banks withdrew but not as fast 
as others. 
Table 7: Bank exposures to Greece 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total foreign claims 
..in %GDP 88.4 69.1 50.1 40.7 23.2 
..% change Dec-Dec -1.9 -12.5 -31.9 -26.0 -51.5 
Share of  
..French banks 26.7 31.8 33.0 33.1 36.6* 
..German banks 14.2 19.1 21.1 27.7 29.0* 
*Sept 2012, due to apparent error in the data for Dec 2012. 
Sources: see Table 5 
 
In April-May 2010, the Greek government sought program financing from the IMF and the 
EU. The EU had no scheme in place, and assembled its contribution to the Greek Loan 
Facility (GLF) through hasty bilateral agreements with member states. It sought 
contributions in proportion to Euro members’ shares of GDP (which correspond to their 
paid-up shares of ECB capital). The first program for Greece addressed the country’s loss of 
market access for its sovereign debt, as well as establishing a Financial Stability Fund to 
support Greek banks.  
The financial problems facing Greece had their origins in fiscal imbalances to a larger extent 
than in Ireland and Spain, where a systemic banking crisis was the central problem. 
However, the structure of liquidity provision in the Euro area means that both public and 
private imbalances emerge as sovereign debt crises. It matters little whether the ‘original 
sin’ is public or private, as Pisani-Ferry et al (2013) explain. The received view is that 
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countries in the Euro area could not suffer a balance of payments (BoP) crisis, but this is 
incorrect. A BoP crisis can happen, in the sense that public and private entities seeking 
credit can find that parties will not lend to them because of the country they belong to 
(Pisani-Ferry et al 2013: 9). Banks can overcome the loss of confidence of external creditors, 
however, by making use of liquidity support from the ECB. So long as this support remains in 
place – which in practice it has, although its form has changed over time9 - the BoP crisis 
appears only when the sovereign can no longer issue bonds at sustainable costs. This 
happens whether or not the original problem is excessive public or private borrowing.  
The first lending program envisaged that stability would be restored by 2012 or 2013, but, 
as the Greek economy contracted, its debt dynamics became unstable. Moreover, it is 
noticeable that the evolution of its debt burden between 2009 and 2012 was startlingly 
adverse, for reasons not related to its primary imbalances. Adding together the outturns 
under the first program (2010-2011), the accumulated primary deficit was 7.1% of GDP, 
while the debt ratio increased by more than 40% of GDP (Table 8). It was economic 
contraction and high real interest rates that made Greece’s public debt-GDP ratio balloon.  
                                                           
9 Heavy reliance by Greek banks on Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) is particularly evident by 
2012 (Pisani-Ferry et al 2013: 14)  
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Table 8: IMF analysis of Greece’s debt dynamic 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Change in public sector debt/GDP ratio 
of which: 
5.2 16.8 18.6 22.7 -13.1 
Debt-creating flows: primary deficit 4.8 10.4 4.8 2.3 1.5 
Debt dynamics 1: real interest rate 0.3 2.6 4.5 5.6 6.0 
Debt dynamics 2: GDP growth 0.2 3.6 6.6 11.2 11.0 
Bank recapitalization, PSI sweeteners 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.9 
Residual - incl debt relief -0.3 0.3 2.2 2.8 -70.9 
Source: IMF 2013c Annex Table AI.1 
The second rescue program with its considerable debt write-down provided much less relief 
to Greek public finances than the ‘haircut’ on private bond holdings of 70% would lead one 
to expect. Table 8 shows the effect in 2012: restructuring reduced the debt/ GDP ratio by 
71%, but this was reduced by half (38%) due to the requirement to recapitalize domestic 
banks, and cover other ‘sweeteners’ (the term is the IMF’s) in private sector involvement 
(PSI). By 2012, Greek sovereign debt had ceased to be part of the diversified portfolios of 
international banks, and became concentrated in Greek banks. Results from bank stress 
tests conducted in 2011 revealed that, of the €76.3 bn of Greek debt held by banks in 
August 2011, 63% was held by Greek banks, amounting to 212% of their core tier 1 capital 
(Blundell-Wignall 2012: 211).10 In other words, PSI forced mainly Greek banks to write down 
Greek public debt, and when the insolvent banks had to be recapitalized out of the second 
rescue loan, this support ended up on the Greek government’s books. 
                                                           
10 Banks in other countries also tended to hold high proportions of their own country’s sovereign 
debt, but not to such high percentages of their capital: next after Greece were Italian and Spanish 
banks, holding own country sovereign debt to the tune of 161% and 152% of core tier 1 capital, 
respectively (Blundell-Wignall 2012). 
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Bindseil and Winkler (2012) note more generally what the Greek case illustrates in its most 
extreme form: the costs of salvaging the banking system soar when banks provide a channel 
of finance to the government. The absence of central bank financing for sovereign debt 
produces a ‘diabolic loop’ whereby sovereign debt restructuring damages the financial 
soundness of banks, and this in turn imposes further costs on the sovereign (De Grauwe 
2012: 117).  
This would not have happened if the write-down had come while foreign banks were still 
heavily exposed to Greek debt, but by 2012 they had off-loaded most of their holdings. 
Tables 5-7 showed that Greece experienced a larger reduction in foreign bank exposures 
than Hungary and Latvia, even before the final blow of debt restructuring. In the end, ECB 
liquidity provision allowed foreign banks to cut their losses, leaving the Greek government, 
firms and households bearing most of the burden of reducing indebtedness. 
Reluctant hegemony or counterproductive cooperation? 
In this section we ask: what are the missing resources for stabilization in the Euro area, and 
how might they be provided? Following Kindleberger, we consider three aspects of 
stabilization of a monetary system: (i) provision of liquidity by a lender of last resort; (ii) 
resolution of solvency issues affecting the sovereign or the banking system; and (iii) 
redressing fundamental imbalances and averting protectionism.  
Emphasizing that the provision of stability is a public good, susceptible to free-riding, 
Kindleberger (1973) argued that hegemonic leadership is needed, a role played for many 
years by the United States. Eichengreen (1987) revisited Kindleberger’s account and argued 
that cooperation, rather than hegemonic leadership, has historically provided the basis for 
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stabilization. Revisiting Kindleberger again in the light of the Euro crisis, DeLong and 
Eichengreen (2013) suggest that the Euro area lacks a central bank willing to act as a lender 
of last resort to sovereigns, while the one country with the capacity to engage in a 
countercyclical fiscal policy, Germany, is unwilling to do so.  Germany is a potential 
hegemon which ‘still thinks of itself as steward of a small, open economy’ (DeLong and 
Eichengreen 2013: 10).  
We have shown that international assistance was needed by Hungary and Latvia to provide 
liquidity to the banking system, recapitalize banks and provide funds to the government. 
This assistance took the form of loan programs led by cooperative institutions: the IMF and 
the EU. Kindleberger (2000: 216) doubted that loan programs alone could provide stability 
because of their finite-ness: ‘Amounts agreed in advance are almost certain to be too little, 
and they tip the hand of the authorities to the speculators.’ However, in the Hungarian and 
Latvian cases, speculation did not swallow the resources of the loan program because 
international banks did not rush to the exit, divesting themselves of currency and 
government bonds.  
Importantly, this was achieved at least in part because of the cooperation of the home 
states of these banks. It is tempting to see Sweden as the deep-pocketed regional hegemon 
in the Latvian case. But the ability of the Swedish central bank to support its banks 
(including their international operations) was itself the product of cooperation between 
central banks, through the extension of swap lines. Similarly, banks with subsidiaries in 
Hungary were supported by the ECB’s provision of liquidity. Some of these banks also 
required capital injections from their home states, and international cooperation ensured 
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that these states were barred from insisting that their banks concentrated their lending at 
home and reined in their international operations. 
Institutionalized cooperation was also evident in averting protectionism. The EU was active 
in insisting on the maintenance of nondiscriminatory internal market norms, particularly in 
the first phase of the crisis when many states adopted fiscal stimulus programs. However, 
Eichengreen and Temin (2010) argue that the EU lacks the institutions to address 
fundamental imbalances, because it has no way to insist on demand expansion by surplus 
states, which means that the burden of adjustment always falls on deficit countries. While 
Eichengreen and Temin see this as a problem of the Euro area, it is actually an issue for all 
states with heavy trade dependence on the German economy. We can see that this failing in 
the EU’s institutional design did not prevent stabilization in Hungary and Latvia, although it 
may condemn them to low growth in the medium term. 
Turning to Greece, we found that the provision of liquidity to the banking system appeared 
early on to be an attractive feature of Euro membership. By contrast with Hungary and 
Latvia, no international assistance was needed to maintain liquidity: Greek banks had direct 
access to the ECB. However, as the solvency of the government and the banking system 
(held in a close embrace) came into question, a loan program was needed. Furthermore, 
Kindleberger’s dictum was repeatedly borne out: finite resources tipped the hands of the 
authorities to the speculators. The markets repeatedly took the view that the resources of 
the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and subsequently the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) were inadequate, a view no doubt reinforced by the well-publicized 
resistance of the contributing states, led by Germany. As Kindleberger predicted, the deep 
pockets of the central bank were needed to quell speculation: in 2012 Governor Draghi 
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announced a program that promised, under certain conditions, to buy in secondary markets 
unlimited amounts of bonds issued by governments under siege. Furthermore,  the ECB 
would not claim seniority for its bond holdings should a government default.11  This speech 
had a self-fulfilling reassuring effect on financial markets and no action was required, as of 
2013, despite the fragile legal basis for this bond-buying program. 
However, the ECB cannot itself be the hegemonic provider of stability, just as the Federal 
Reserve was not the hegemon in Kindleberger’s account. Rather, the Fed could intervene 
because the US Treasury stood behind it, ready to indemnify its losses (Schelkle 2012: 41). 
The ECB has very limited own-capacity to absorb losses: its capital base amounts to a mere 
€10.5 bn. Further losses would have to be absorbed by subscribing governments, and they 
have resisted establishing a common fund to indemnify ECB losses.  In this light, the ECB 
appears as a lonely institution, creating money without the backing of a state (Goodhart 
1998: 420, 424-25).  
The comparison of Greece with Hungary and Latvia highlights the lack of institutionalized 
cooperation in the regulation of banking systems in the Euro area. This partly reflects 
limited foreign ownership: most banking systems in the Euro area are dominated by 
domestic banks.  But it is also striking that more was done to prevent beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies in the European periphery than in the Euro area. Epstein (2013: 6-9) gives a number 
of examples of Euro area regulators ‘ring fencing’ their own banking systems, whereas the 
Vienna Initiative actively countered beggar-thy-neighbor regulatory behavior towards states 
outside the Euro area.  The integration of Euro area capital markets, reflected particularly in 
                                                           
11
 Speech by Mario Draghi at the Global Investment Conference in London, July 26th, 2012. URL: 
http://www.ecb.Europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html and further spelled out  at 
URL: http://www.ecb.Europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html (accessed  January 2nd, 
2014). 
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cross-border holdings of sovereign debt, turned rapidly to disintegration and the re-
nationalization of banks’ holdings of government debt (Thompson and Jenkins 2013).  
Germany was one of the culprits in this re-nationalization (Bloomberg 2013). It can be 
accused of not showing leadership in maintaining exposures to struggling southern 
economies, but it was never in a dominant position. As Table 7 showed, French banks were 
more exposed to Greek debt than German banks. Simulations of partial debt defaults 
conducted by the IMF (2013d: 37) show France to be the EU country most exposed to losses 
on sovereign claims generally: it would take some 35% of EU losses, fractionally higher than 
Germany, followed at some distance by the UK and the Netherlands.12 It follows that France 
had the strongest incentives to promote new cooperative institutions, and indeed this is 
reflected in French initiatives. Germany has resisted the establishment of new institutions, 
and has contributed (only) in proportion to its size, although ultimately Germany will bear a 
disproportionate burden if other countries are unable to cover their shares.13  
In any case, Germany cannot be the hegemon, because it no longer has a central bank. It 
does not have deep monetary pockets; its contributions must be fiscal, and therefore 
subject to the constraint of the bond markets. Germany has been concerned not to enter 
commitments that would jeopardize its credit rating. Furthermore, it has imposed self-
restraints that limit its capacity to provide stabilizing resources, notably the ‘debt brake’ on 
the government.  Fiscal constraints contribute to Germany’s dilatory approach to 
                                                           
12 Their estimates are for losses on claims on Greece of 70%, and Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
(20%).  
13 Program countries are already exempt from guaranteeing bond issues of an emergency fund, and 
it is recognised that some non-program countries, such as Italy, would not be able to meet their 
obligations in the event of a large call, for example arising from a systemic collapse of Spanish banks. 
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recapitalizing its own banking system, which has led in turn to the use of beggar-thy-
neighbor regulatory measures to enhance the availability of domestic credit.  
The ECB had to depart from the founding expectations of independent central bank 
behavior. It has taken on the role of lender of last resort (LOLR) to the banking system in an 
unprecedented way. Its predecessor, the Bundesbank, was reluctant to assume the LOLR 
role, holding that it should be undertaken by the government (James 2010: 20-21). The ECB 
has become a post-hegemonic institution in the sense of Keohane (1984), ending Germany’s 
monetary dominance and emancipating itself from being merely a Bundesbank writ large. 
But the singular independence of the ECB has led it to fight the solvency problems of banks 
as if they were liquidity problems, because it cannot make fiscal authorities play their role in 
bank recapitalization. In this light, the missing element in the Euro system is not the absence 
of a hegemonic member state, but the lack of a collective fiscal backstop for the central 
bank.  
Conclusion 
In this article, we have analyzed the Euro area as an international monetary system. We 
examined the resources of stabilization that the Euro area provides to a country in trouble 
(Greece), in contrast to EU members that retained an adjustable or fixed exchange rate 
(Hungary and Latvia). We found that the rules governing EMU’s cooperative institutions had 
unintended aggravating consequences for Greece, while ad-hoc cooperation outside the 
framework of EMU helped Hungary and Latvia.  In other words, the amplification of the 
Greek crisis was due to the operation of the system, not due to its breakdown in a moment 
of crisis.  
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The comparison of three countries showed that Greece’s sovereign debt crisis was 
aggravated, first of all, by the fact that the government was kept afloat by the ECB’s liquidity 
support for Euro area banks. This allowed macroeconomic imbalances to accumulate for 
another year, compared to Hungary and Latvia. Furthermore, the provision of liquidity 
turned out to allow capital flight, as foreign banks reduced their exposures. Using the 
domestic banking system as lender of last resort to the sovereign set up the ‘diabolic loop’ 
of bank and sovereign interdependence, once the insolvency of the Greek government 
became apparent. After Greek sovereign debt was written down, bank restructuring costs 
were imposed on the Greek budget, further worsening the fiscal position. None of this was 
the fault of the ECB; the lack of some fiscal back-up for the lonely central bank is to blame. 
Hungary and Latvia needed external assistance to provide liquidity to their sovereigns. In 
neither country could the national central bank ‘print money’ to buy government bonds 
because the expansion of the domestic money supply would have created more incentives 
for capital flight and devaluation. The liquidity and solvency problems of Hungarian and 
Latvian banks and households were contained by external assistance and cooperation which 
prevented these problems spilling over to the government in a catastrophic way. In applying 
the theory of stabilization of international monetary systems, we are open to the finding 
that a hegemon is needed to provide stability. The European project has been one of 
building cooperative institutions to restrain Germany’s hegemonic power (as DeLong and 
Eichengreen 2013: 10n acknowledge), and in this it has largely succeeded.  In European 
banking, Germany is just one big player among several. Nor does the German government 
have the deep pockets of its own central bank. 
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The alternative advanced by some adherents of monetary sovereignty implies that EMU 
needs centralized fiscal authority. We showed that a crisis of financial markets became a 
crisis for sovereigns, but that is not where solutions are to be found. A banking union would 
separate sovereign risk from banking risk, helping to break the diabolic loop that has 
affected Greece. Hence, our analysis challenges the view that EMU has to become a more 
complete state with the creation of a central budget. Specific institutions like a joint 
resolution fund are required to prevent sudden stops and capital flight within the Euro area. 
For this to happen, the stronger economies would have to give up their resistance to any 
joint fiscal liability, but they do not have to embrace a full fiscal union with a central budget. 
Critics of EMU show an overblown faith in the economic power of states with their own 
currencies and central banks. Most states are vulnerable to financial panics and sudden 
stops in the market for government bonds, as the continued need for central bank 
cooperation and IMF intervention demonstrate. Joining the euro means obtaining the 
protection of a reserve currency: this is a resource for stabilization and should make 
countries less vulnerable than if they maintain their own non-reserve currency. Countries 
continue to join the euro for this reason. So long as the model of the single sovereign state 
is held up as the political-economic ideal, EMU will always appear to be in an impasse. What 
will work economically (a unified budget) is not acceptable politically; what is desired 
politically (monetary union without a central budget) cannot be made to work economically. 
By analyzing EMU as an international monetary system rather than an incomplete state, we 
demonstrate that it does not have to enter this impasse, and can instead create cooperative 
institutions to provide stabilization.  
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